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PRESIDENTIAL UNILATERALISM AND POLITICAL 
POLARIZATION: WHY TODAY'S CONGRESS LACKS 
THE WILL AND THE WAY TO STOP PRESIDENTIAL 
INITIATIVES 
NEAL DEVINS • 
I know. This is a symposium about presidential power in the 
21st century. My essay, however, will focus on Congress. In 
particular, I want to examine the conditions in which Congress will 
have the necessary will and way to check presidential initiatives. And 
even more particularly, I want to assess whether a politically 
polarized Congress can check presidential unilateralism. 
Let me start by quoting Justice Jackson, Justice Ginsburg, and 
David Gergen. 
First, Justice Jackson: In the Steel Seizure case, Justice 
Jackson-who had served both as Attorney General and Solicitor 
General in the Roosevelt administration--closed his opinion with an 
observation about the balance of power between the president, the 
Congress, and the judiciary: 
I have no illusion that any decision by this Court can keep power 
in the hands of Congress if it is not wise and timely in meeting its 
problems .... If not good law, there was worldly wisdom in the 
maxim ... that "The tools belong to the man who can use them." 
We may say that power to legislate for emergencies belongs in the 
hands of Congress, but only Congress itself can prevent power 
from slipping through its fingers. 1 
Justice Ginsburg echoed this theme when serving on the D.C. 
Circuit. In turning back a lawsuit by members of Congress who 
challenged the Reagan administration's backing of the Contras as 
unconstitutionally subverting Congress's war making powers, then-
judge Ginsburg contended that: 
• Goodrich Professor of Law and Professor of Government, College of William and 
Mary. This essay plays off of remarks made at the Presidential Power in the Twenty First 
Century Conference. Thanks to Norman Williams for organizing the conference and to 
Andrea Johnson and Arpan Sura for research assistance. 
I. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343 U.S. 579, 654 (1952). 
395 
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Congress has fonnidable weapons at its disposal-the power of 
the purse and investigative resources far beyond those available in 
the Third Branch .... "If Congress chooses not to confront the 
President, it is not our task to do so."2 
And finally David Gergen (advisor to Presidents Nixon, Ford, 
and Clinton)-who linked Watergate-era efforts by Congress to assert 
its institutional prerogatives over war, spending, and the like to the 
George W. Bush White House's seeming obsession with presidential 
power. Gergen, in particular, explained. how Dick Cheney's 
experiences as Ford's chief of staff played a defining role in the Bush 
administration's strong view of presidential power. Gergen observed: 
[F]rom the [Ford] White House point of view, those laws-you 
felt like you were Gulliver in Lilli put. You had all these strings 
that were tying you down, and you really couldn't act .... 
So in effect we moved from the imperial presidency of Richard 
Nixon very quickly into what many of us thought was an imperiled 
presidency under Gerald Ford .... 
That was a pivotal moment in the education of Dick Cheney. 
Many of us felt strongly that the power of the presidency was 
threatened, that America could not lead in the world and couldn't 
get much done in Washington unless you had a more effective 
chief executive .... 
. . . [When George W Bush was elected, Cheney felt that] the 
president was still too hamstrung, and he came in bound and 
detennined as vice president to change that.3 
Let me connect these quotes together by laying out my central 
argument: presidential power is largely defined by the tug and pull 
between Congress and the White House. During the Watergate-era, a 
bipartisan Congress was able to come together to limit presidential 
power. The Bush presidency, in part, was a reaction to those limits-
an attempt to extend the advances of Presidents Reagan and Clinton 
and assert an even stronger view of the President's power to act 
unilaterally. And while the Supreme Court has placed some limits on 
presidential power, the real story of the Bush presidency was the 
inability of a polarized Congress to check the President. Unless and 
until party polarization diminishes, Congress is unlikely to assert its 
2. Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 770 F.2d 202, 211 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Ginsburg, J., 
concurring) (quoting Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 998 (1979)). 
3. Frontline, Interview with David Gergen, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/ 
cheney/interviews/gergen.html (last visited Jan. 31, 2009). 
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institutional prerogatives.4 As such, even if the Bush administration 
hurt itself in court by failing to consult Congress or asserting an 
overly zealous view of presidential power, or by doing both, those 
failures are not likely to diminish presidential power in the near 
future. 
My comments will be loosely organized around three interrelated 
topics. 
First, I will discuss the competing incentives of the President and 
Congress-incentives that make it likely that the President will 
expand the scope of presidential power simply by pursuing favored 
policy initiatives. Correspondingly, I will explain how these 
incentives cut against members of Congress acting in a unified way to 
assert Congress's institutional prerogatives. 
Second, I will highlight how the Watergate-era Congress worked 
as an institution to check presidential power. By focusing the nation's 
attention on the risks of a too powerful executive, Watergate and Viet 
Nam before it propelled Congress into action-so that lawmakers 
were able to advance personal goals by standing up for institutional 
incentives. As such, Congress had the will to act. More than that, 
lawmakers found a way to come together and check presidential 
unilateralism. During this era, Congress was not polarized by parties 
and, consequently, Democrats and Republicans were able to act in 
bipartisan ways. They did this through the impeachment of President 
Nixon and, more tellingly, through the enactment of a broad range of 
reform measures intended to assert Congress's institutional 
prerogatives (and, in so doing, limit the sweep of presidential power). 
Third, I will contrast the Watergate-era Congress to today's 
Congress. I make this comparison for several reasons. As noted 
above, the Watergate-era played a defining role in Dick Cheney's 
vision of executive power-so much so that the Watergate-era and the 
George W. Bush presidency are inextricably linked. 
Correspondingly, just as Richard Nixon asserted a broad view of 
presidential power and suffered both judicial defeats and low 
4. The above analysis assumes that there will be at least 40 members of the President's 
party in the Senate. If there were a super-majority of 60 or more senators from the opposition 
party, the opposition party would have a filibuster-proof majority to advance a competing 
policy agenda. And while the President might use his veto power to limit that policy agenda 
(assuming that at least one-third of either the House or Senate are members of the President's 
party), it is nonetheless true that the Senate would be well positioned to pursue an ideological 
agenda at odds with the President. In so doing, the Senate would undoubtedly seek to advance 
Congress's institutional prerogatives. 
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presidential approval ratings, George W. Bush likewise suffered both 
judicial defeats and low presidential approval ratings for his arguably 
overzealous claims of presidential power. Needless to say, the 
criminal misdeeds of the Nixon administration should not be equated 
with the policy failings of the Bush administration. At the same time, 
the Nixon and Bush presidencies provided opportunities for Congress 
to assert its institutional prerogatives and check presidential power. 
The stark contrast between Congress's response to the Nixon and 
Bush presidencies calls attention to the circumstances where Congress 
does not have the needed will and way to check presidential power. 
In highlighting differences between the Watergate-era Congress 
and the modem Congress, Part III will examine the profound role that 
political polarization has played in defining today's Congress. 
Initially, I will call attention to how political polarization makes it 
impossible for Democrats and Republicans in Congress to work 
together. I will then extend that lesson to the highly partisan 
impeachment of President Clinton and, more importantly, to the ways 
in which modem day Presidents have assumed more and more power 
through unilateral action. Making matters worse (at least if you think 
Congress should stand as a check to presidential unilateralism), 
members of Congress see little personal gain in standing together to 
assert Congress's institutional prerogatives. On national security 
matters, today's Congress-unlike the post-1969 Viet Nam era 
Congress-sees little benefit in asserting legislative prerogatives. Put 
another way: Today's Congress, unlike the Watergate-era, has neither 
the will nor the way to check presidential initiatives. 
Before turning to Part I, let me clarify two points that underlie 
the analysis that is to follow. First, the focus of this essay is the 
President's power to advance favored policy initiatives. I do not 
consider the separate question of presidential power over the 
administrative state. More to the point, if the President does not 
express a strong policy preference or, alternatively, delegates decision 
making authority to agency heads, it may be that agency heads will 
not look to the White House for policy direction. Agency heads, 
instead, may focus on their own personal agenda or the agendas of 
congressional committees, interest groups, or careerists in their 
agency. For reasons I will detail in Part III of this essay, however, 
Presidents increasingly seek to rein in agency direction-by 
appointing presidential loyalists and by making use of regulatory 
review procedures and pre-enforcement directives such as signing 
statements. Second, in saying that presidential power is largely 
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defined by the dance that takes place between Congress and the White 
House, I do not mean to suggest that the courts have no role to play in 
the separation of powers. My point, instead, is that court decisions 
are of limited reach. They typically settle a case; they rarely establish 
precedents that define subsequent bargaining between the executive 
and Congress. In case studies of Supreme Court rulings on the 
legislative veto, executive privilege, and war powers, Lou Fisher and 
I (both individually and collectively) have demonstrated the limited 
reach of Supreme Court decisions.5 In this essay, I will make limited 
reference to those writings-but I will not try to establish a point that 
I have made several times before. 
I. THE COMPETING INCENTIVES OF THE PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS6 
Thanks both to the singularity of the office and the power to 
execute, Presidents are well positioned to advance their policy agenda 
and, in so doing, expand the power of the presidency. In explaining 
how it is that Presidents are motivated to seek power and have the 
tools to accomplish the task, political scientists Terry Moe and 
William Howell put it this way: "[W]hen presidents feel it is in their 
political interests, they can put whatever decisions they like to 
strategic use, both in gaining policy advantage and in pushing out the 
boundaries of their power."7 
Most significant, when Presidents act, it is up to the other 
branches to respond. In other words, Presidents often win by 
default--either because Congress chooses not to respond or because 
its response is ineffective. Furthermore, by end running the 
burdensome and often unsuccessful strategy of seeking legislative 
authorization, unilateral presidential action expands the institutional 
powers and prerogatives of the presidency. In other words, the 
President's personal interests and the presidency's institutional 
5. See LOUIS FISHER & NEAL DEVINS, POLITICAL DYNAMICS OF CONSTITUTIONAL 
LAW (4th ed. 2006) (legislative veto); Neal Devins, Congressional-Executive Information 
Access Disputes: A Modest Proposal-Do Nothing, 48 ADMIN. L. REv. 109 (1996) (executive 
privilege); Neal Devins & Louis Fisher, The Steel Seizure Case: One of a Kind?, 19 CONST. 
COMMENT. 63 (2002) (war powers); NEAL DEVINS & LOUIS FISHER, THE DEMOCRATIC 
CONSTITUTION 77-126 (2004) (general discussion of how politics, not court decisions, defines 
both domestic separation of powers and war powers). 
6. This section is drawn from Neal Devins, Abdication by Another Name: An Ode to Lou 
Fisher, 19 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 65, 66-68 (2000). 
7. Terry M. Moe & William G. Howell, The Presidential Power of Unilateral Action, 15 
J. L. ECON. &0RG.132, 138 (1999). 
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interests are often one and the same. For this very reason, Presidents 
have expanded the reach of presidential power by advancing favored 
policies through executive orders, Office of Management and Budget 
review of proposed agency regulations, pre-enforcement directives 
(especially signing statements), and broad claims of inherent 
presidential power (especially the power to launch military strikes and 
the power to withhold information from Congress). 
Unlike the presidency, the individual and institutional interests 
of members of Congress are often in conflict with one another. While 
each of Congress's 535 members has some stake in Congress as an 
institution, parochial interests will overwhelm this collective good. In 
particular, members of Congress regularly tradeoff their interest in 
Congress as an institution for their personal interests-most notably, 
reelection and advancing their (and their constituents') policy agenda. 
In describing this collective action problem, Moe and Howell note 
that lawmakers are "trapped in a prisoner's dilemma: all might benefit 
if they could cooperate in defending or advancing Congress's power, 
but each has a strong incentive to free ride in favor of the local 
constituency. "8 
For this reason, lawmakers have no incentive to stop presidential 
unilateralism simply because the President is expanding his powers 
vis-a-vis Congress. Consider, for example, the President's use of 
executive orders to advance favored policies and presidential 
initiatives to launch military initiatives. Between 1973 and 1998, 
Presidents issued about 1,000 executive orders. Only 37 of these 
orders were challenged in Congress and only 3 of these challenges 
resulted in legislation.9 
Presidential unilateralism in launching military operations is 
even more striking-because it involves the President's willingness to 
commit the nation's blood without congressional authorization. 
Notwithstanding the clear constitutional mandate that Congress play a 
significant role in triggering military operations, Congress has very 
little incentive in playing a leadership role. Rather than oppose the 
President on a potential military action, most members of Congress 
find it more convenient to acquiesce and avoid criticism that they 
obstructed a necessary military operation. 
8. !d. at 144. 
9. !d. at 165-66. For a more complete inventory of congressional acquiescence to 
unilateral presidential policymaking, see WILLIAM G. HOWELL, POWER WITHOUT 
PERSUASION 112-20 (2003). 
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Let's now shift focus to the Nixon presidency and Congress's 
willingness to check presidential power in response to Viet Nam and 
Watergate. As I will now explain, this willingness was tied to two 
phenomena: (1) Congress had the tools to act-Congress was not 
sharply divided by ideology and, consequently, could work together 
in a bipartisan way; and (2) Congress had the will to act. Presidential 
unilateralism was so unpopular with voters and other constituents that 
lawmakers achieved political advantage by curbing presidential 
power through a slew of post-Watergate era legislative enactments. 
II. THE WATERGATE ERA (1972-1978) 
To start, a few words about Nixon's exercise of presidential 
power. By moving aggressively both on domestic and national 
security matters, Nixon sought both to advance his policy agenda and 
to extend the reach of presidential power. 10 Most notably, Nixon (like 
President Johnson before him) claimed "broad, virtually unchecked 
authority to conduct military operations in Southeast Asia." 11 He also 
pushed his commander-in-chief power to block publication of the 
Pentagon Papers and to engage in warrantless wiretapping in 
domestic national security cases (claims that the Supreme Court 
rejected in the Pentagon Papers and Keith decisions ). 12 
In the areas of domestic policy, Nixon moved aggressively to 
assert presidential powers to impound funds and to pocket veto 
legislation. 13 He sought to reorganize, by executive order, the federal 
government by placing major executive departments (including 
cabinet officers) under the control of presidential assistants. 14 Nixon 
also sought to frustrate legislative oversight of the executive branch 
through claims of executive privilege. Attorney General Richard 
I 0. See generally Peter E. Quint, The Separation of Powers Under Nixon: Reflections on 
Constitutional Liberties and the Rule of Law, 1981 DUKE L.J. I ( 1981 ). It should be noted at 
the outset that Nixon inherited a strong presidency and sought to build upon the practices of 
past Presidents (who used "foreign emergencies and the increasing centralization of the 
domestic economy" as opportunities to expand presidential power). Jd. at 2. 
II. Geoffrey P. Miller, From Compromise to Confrontation: Separation of Powers in 
the Reagan Era, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 401,408 (1989). 
12. New York Times, Co. v. United States (The Pentagon Papers), 403 U.S. 713 (1971); 
United States v. U.S. Dist. Court for E. Dist. of Mich. (Keith), 407 U.S. 297 (1972). For 
additional discussion, see Quint, supra note 10. 
13. See LOUIS FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICTS BETWEEN CONGRESS AND THE 
PRESIDENT 126-27, 131, 200-.0J (5th ed. rev. 2007). 
14. PHILIP 8. KURLAND, WATERGATE AND THE CONSTITUTION 198 ( 1978); JONATHAN 
SCHELL, THE TIME OF ILLUSION 296-98 ( 1976). 
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Keleindienst testified before Congress that "executive privilege 
insulated the testimony and documents of all employees of the 
executive branch . . . and that the privilege can be invoked even 
against an impeachment inquiry involving criminal wrongdoing by 
the President or his advisors." 15 
Commenting on Nixon's assertions of executive power, Arthur 
Schlessinger claimed that Nixon had subverted our constitutional 
system of checks and balances. Dubbing Nixon's style of 
government "the imperial presidency," Schlessinger argued that 
Nixon carried to an extreme a trend towards increased presidential 
power in American govemment. 16 
Before Watergate, Congress enacted the War Powers Resolution 
of 1973 but otherwise took limited action to countermand the 
President. During and following Watergate, Congress enacted a slew 
of legislative restrictions on the President-starting with the 1974 
Budget and Impoundment Act (enacted less than one month before 
Nixon's resignation) and ending with the 1978 Ethics in Government 
Act. Congress's willingness to enact these measures, as I will now 
show, is a byproduct both of the lack of ideological polarization in 
Congress and intense public disapproval of Viet Nam and Nixon 
administration overreaching. 
Consider VietNam. When Richard Nixon took office in 1969, 
Congress had strong incentives to assert itself and seek an end to 
American involvement in Southeast Asia. Before 1969, lawmakers 
provided funding and other support to a war that was almost 
exclusively defined by presidential initiative. 17 But with heavy 
casualties and no apparent end in sight, lawmakers could not sit on 
the sidelines and expect to be supported by home state voters. In 
1969, a bipartisan Senate passed the National Commitments 
Resolution--expressing the Senate's belief that the commitment of 
U.S. armed forces on foreign territory required "affirmative action 
taken by the executive and legislative branches of the United States 
Govemment."18 In 1973 (after a series of mis-starts), Congress 
enacted-over Nixon's veto-the muddled War Powers Resolution of 
15. Quint, supra note 10, at 30 (citing RAOUL BERGER, EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE: A 
CONSTITUTIONAL MYTH 254--64 (1974)). 
16. ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY ( 1973). 
17. See LOUIS FISHER, PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWER (2nd ed. rev. 2004). 
18. Louis Fisher, Congressional Abdication: War and Spending Powers, 43 ST. LOUIS 
U. L.J. 931,961-63 (1999) (quoting S. Rep. No. 91-129, at I (1969)). 
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1973. 19 The stated purpose of the Resolution was to "'fulfill the 
intent of the framers' and to 'insure that the collective judgment of 
both the Congress and the President' will apply to the introduction of 
U.S. forces to foreign hostilities."20 
Lawmakers echoed this theme of checks and balances when 
enacting a range of reforms during and after Watergate. These 
measures responded both to voter and lawmaker dissatisfaction with 
presidential overreaching. In particular, presidential efforts to block 
both Congress and the courts from investigating Watergate were too 
much for the American people and Congress. As Peter Quint put it, 
Watergate brought the nation "face to face with the problem of 
presidential power, framed not as an issue of political principle, but as 
a simple question of criminal right and wrong."21 
In Congress, lawmakers reflected popular sentiment against a too 
powerful President and, in so doing, stood up for their institutional 
prerogatives. Louisiana Democrat Gillis Long put it this way: 
Congress will not stand by idly as the President reaches for more 
and more power .... Our message to the President is that he is 
risking retaliation from the Congress for his power grabs, that 
support for the counter-offensive is found in the whole range of 
congressional membership-old Members and new, liberal and 
conservative, Democratic and Republican.22 
Among several examples of congressional efforts to assert its 
institutional prerogatives, I will highlight two23-the 1974 
Impoundment Control Act and the 1978 Ethics in Government Act. 
The Impoundment Control Act was a response to the Nixon 
administration's impounding of funds to advance its policy 
priorities-fiscal and otherwise. By refusing to spend appropriated 
funds, the administration both weakened disfavored programs and 
effectively told Congress that "congressional add-ons to the 
President's budget were irresponsible and wholly lacking in merit."24 
19. See id. at 963-67. 
20. /d. at 964 (quoting Pub. L. No. 93-148, § 2(a), 87 Stat. 555 (1973)). 
21. Quint, supra note 10, at 3. 
22. Quoted in JAMES L. SUNDQUIST, THE DECLINE AND RESURGENCE OF CONGRESS 6-
7 (1981) (omission in original). 
23. For a listing of Watergate-era statutes limiting presidential power, see Miller, supra 
note 11, at 410--11; Andrew Rudalevige, The Contemporary Presidency: The Decline and 
Resurgence and Decline (and Resurgence?) of Congress: Charting a New Imperial 
Presidency, 36 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 506, 509 (2006). 
24. FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICTS BETWEEN CONGRESS AND THE PRESIDENT, 
supra note 13, at 200. 
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Intended to "restore responsibility for the spending policy of the 
United States to the legislative branch," the Impoundment Act, among 
other things, forced the President to formally seek legislative approval 
before rescinding (terminating) appropriations.25 
The 1978 Ethics in Government Act was also enacted to 
"invigorate the constitutional separation of powers between the three 
branches of govemment."26 The Act established the independent 
counsel (a direct response to President Nixon's firing of Archibald 
Cox, the first special prosecutor in Watergate). More than that, 
Congress asserted its institutional independence from the executive 
through the creation of a nonpartisan Congressional Legal Counsel. 
No longer willing to rely on the "ad hoc services of the Justice 
Department," Congress concluded that the "interests of Congress as 
an institution" and the "separation of powers" required Congress to 
have its own lawyer.Z7 Most visibly, the Senate Counsel often 
defends the constitutionality of federal statutes that the executive 
branch deems unconstitutional. 
Congress's willingness to assert itself through Watergate-era 
reforms, as suggested above, is tied to popular support for such 
measures. In particular, lawmakers could reward constituents (voters 
and interest groups) by reasserting control over appropriations and by 
expressing disapproval of both presidential unilateralism in Viet Nam 
and presidential wrongdoing in Watergate. More to the point, 
members of Congress gained personal advantage by standing up for 
legislative prerogatives. Voters wanted Congress to check a too 
powerful President-to prevent future Watergates and Viet Nams.28 
Interest group constituents wanted Congress to maintain greater 
control of the appropriations process. 
25. H.R. REP. No. 93-658, at 3463 (1973) (House Report on the Congressional Budget 
and Impoundment Control Act, H.R. 7130, 93d Cong. (1973) (enacted)). 
26. S. REP. No. 95-170, at 1 (1977) (Senate Report on the Ethics in Government Act, S. 
RES. 555, 95th Cong. (1977) (enacted)). 
27. !d. at 11. 
28. Consider, for example, Congress's willingness to override President Nixon's veto of 
the War Powers Resolution. At that time, Nixon had just fired the first Watergate special 
prosecutor, Archibald Cox. More than that, Nixon's first Vice President, Spiro Agnew, had 
resigned in disgrace. Needless to say, the American people were outraged by Nixon 
administration misdeeds and Congress, in tum, was willing to validate that disapproval by 
overriding the President's veto of the War Powers Resolution. See generally STANLY I. 
KUTLER, THE WARS OF WATERGATE: THE LAST CRISIS OF RICHARD NIXON 438-39 (1990) 
(noting, among other things, that 33 members of the House of Representatives who had 
initially opposed the War Powers Resolution voted to override Nixon's veto of the bill after 
Nixon's firing of Archibald Cox). 
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Not only did Congress have the will to enact structural reforms 
that ostensibly limited presidential power, Congress found a way to 
get Democrats and Republicans to join together in approving these 
reform measures. The reason: During the Watergate era, Congress 
was not ideologically polarized along party lines. Unlike today's 
polarized Congress (where Democrats and Republicans are often at 
loggerheads with each other), the pursuit of bipartisan reform was 
much easier to achieve during the Watergate era. Liberal Rockefeller 
Republicans and conservative Southern Democrats pushed both 
parties towards the center. Indeed, "George Wallace justified his 
third-party bid for the presidency by claiming that there was not a 
'dime's worth of difference' between Democrats and Republicans."29 
With Democrats and Republicans able to come together, 
Congress was able to stand up as an institution. I have already 
mentioned some of the landmark reform measures that Congress 
enacted during this period. Each of these measures was passed by 
overwhelming majorities in Congress. The Impoundment Control 
Act had no dissents in the Senate "and only six in the House;" the 
Ethics in Government Act was passed by a vote of74--5 in the Senate 
and 370-23 in the House; the War Powers resolution passed by votes 
of75-20 in the Senate and 238-123 in the House (with several of the 
"no" votes coming from members who wanted an even stronger 
bill).30 
Bipartisanship was reflected in other important ways. When 
considering articles of impeachment against President Nixon, many 
Republicans put loyalty to the President aside and joined with 
Democrats in pursuing the criminal misdeeds of the Nixon White 
House. Seven of seventeen Republicans on the House Judiciary 
Committee joined Democrats in voting for articles of impeachment 
against Nixon.31 And that was before Nixon turned over the smoking 
gun tapes after the Supreme Court turned down his executive 
29. Neal Devins, The Academic Expert Before Congress: Observations and Lessons 
from Bill Van Alstyne's Testimony, 54 DUKE L. J. 1525, 1534 (2005). For general treatments 
of this topic, see Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pi Ides, Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 
119 HARV. L. REV. 2311 (2006). 
30. SUNDQUIST, supra note 22, at 213 (budget act vote), 259 (War Powers Resolution 
vote). See Ken Gormley, An Original Model of the Independent Counsel Statute, 97 MICH. L. 
REV. 601, 624 (1998) (Ethics in Government Act vote). 
31. See Richard K. Neumann, Jr., The Revival of Impeachment as a Partisan Political 
Weapon, 34 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 161,255 (2007). 
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privilege claim.32 Following the release of the tapes, all but one 
Republican expressed support for the impeachment.33 
Another example of bipartisanship was the use of unified 
committee staff-rather than separate staffs for the majority and 
minority party. Under this model, committee members and staff 
would work together-rather than try to frustrate the political 
objectives of the other side.34 Indeed, when the House Judiciary 
Committee began its impeachment inquiry of President Nixon, it 
formed a special nonpartisan Impeachment Inquiry Staff.35 
And while it would be wrong to say that there were no partisan 
divisions during this time, it is clear that lawmakers had both the will 
and way to check presidential initiatives. With no significant 
ideological divide between Democrats and Republicans, lawmakers 
were able to come together in a bipartisan way. The personal 
interests of lawmakers, moreover, were advanced by working together 
to check potential presidential overreaching. Perhaps for this reason, 
"the size and activity of congressional staffs doubled and then 
doubled again in the early 1970s as Congress began to reassert 
privileges and investigative prerogatives that had waned during the" 
presidencies of Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon.36 
III. THE MODERN ERA 
Let me shift focus to the question that lies at the heart of this 
essay, namely, why party polarization prevents today's Congress from 
standing up for institutional prerogatives and checking the executive 
branch. Please note that I am not taking a position on whether 
President Bush's claims of presidential power were well founded. 
My concern is simply whether today's Congress is capable of 
embracing the types of legislative reforms that were enacted by the 
Watergate-era Congress. 
32. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974). 
33. See Neumann, supra note 31, at 255 . 
34. See Devins, The Academic Expert Before Congress, supra note 29. 
35. Fred H. Altschuler, Comparing the Nixon and Clinton Impeachments, 51 HASTINGS 
L.J. 745, 746 (2000). 
36. David Lauter, As Chief Lawyer for the House, Stanley Brand is Making His Mark, 
NAT'L LJ., May 16, 1983, at I. 
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My analysis will proceed in two parts. First, I will discuss party 
polarization and how it has contributed to the resurgence of 
presidential unilateralism. 37 Second, I will explain why the modem 
day Congress has neither the will nor the way to check presidential 
unilateralism. In particular, Congress's uninterest in asserting 
institutional prerogatives to check the George W. Bush administration 
highlights dramatic differences between the modem day Congress and 
the Watergate-era Congress. 
With regard to party polarization, it is quite clear that the days of 
the Rockefeller Republican and Southern Democrat are behind us. 
Measures of ideology reveal that all or nearly all Republicans are 
more conservative than the most conservative Democrat.38 
Correspondingly, there is no meaningful ideological range within 
either the Democratic or Republican Party. For example, with the 
demise of Rockefeller Republicans and Southern Democrats, the gap 
between Northern and Southern members of the two parties had 
largely disappeared by the 1990s.39 Indeed, as Figure 1 on the 
following page makes abundantly clear, party polarization is more 
extreme today than ever before. 
37. Four paragraphs from this discussion are drawn from Devins, The Academic Expert 
Before Congress, supra note 29, at 1536-38. 
38. See Analyses of Recent Politics, http://voteview.com/ (follow "!lOth Ranking: 
Senate" link for Senate rankings, "!lOth Ranking: House" for House rankings) {last visited 
Feb. I, 2009). 
39. See Jason M. Roberts & Steven S. Smith, Procedural Contexts. Party Strategy, and 
Conditional Party Voting in the U.S. House of Representatives, 1971-2000, 46 AM. J. POL. 
SCI. 305, 306 (2003). 
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Figure 1. 40 
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This pattern will likely continue. With only one-half of eligible 
voters voting, there is greater emphasis on mobilizing the more 
partisan base. More than that, in the House of Representatives, 
computer-driven redistricting has resulted in the drawing of lines that 
essentially guarantee that Democrats will win certain districts and 
Republicans other districts.41 And while there are some toss-up 
districts, the vast majority of districts are noncompetitive. What this 
means is that-in the House-the party primary often controls who 
will win the election and, as such, candidates have incentive to appeal 
to the partisans who vote in the primaries (and not the median voter in 
the general elections).42 
The consequences of party polarization are profound. Party 
leaders, especially in the House, have capitalized on the fact that 
lawmakers are more apt to see themselves as members of a party, not 
as independent power brokers (willing to cross party lines in order to 
40. Reprinted with permission of the author from Keith T. Poole, Party Polarization: 
1879-2008, Polarized America Page, http://polarizedamerica.com (last visited Mar. 25, 2009). 
41. See Samuel Issacharoff, Collateral Damage: The Endangered Center in American 
Politics 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 415, 428-31 (2004). 
42. See Morris P. Fiorina, Whatever Happened to the Median Voter?, Oct. 1999, at 13-
14, available at https://www.msu.edu/-rohde/Fiorina-MIT.pdf. 
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pursue favored policies). Correspondingly, party leaders are 
increasingly concerned with "message politics," that is, with using the 
legislative process to make a symbolic statement to voters and other 
constituents.43 Rather than allow decentralized committees to define 
Congress's agenda, Democrats and Republicans alike see the 
lawmaking process as a way to stand behind a unified party message 
and, in this way, to distinguish their party from the other. Relatedly, 
rather than seek middle ground bipartisan solutions, each party looks 
to gain political advantage from the other. 
The Clinton impeachment is a classic example of this 
phenomenon. Unlike the Nixon impeachment (where members of 
Congress "rose above partisanship"), "it is harder to identify such 
actors" in President Clinton's case.44 "The virtual party-line votes in 
the House and the Senate reinforce public perception of the intense 
partisanship underlying the proceedings. ,.4s 
Party polarization likewise contributes to partisanship in how 
Congress conducts hearings as well as Congress's willingness to hold 
the executive accountable through oversight.46 Today's lawmakers do 
not need hearings to sort out their views. With increasing polarization 
and appeals to the party base, members are both more ideological and 
less trusting of the other party. Correspondingly, majority and 
minority staff rarely work together-instead, each side will call 
witnesses who back up the predetermined views of the party that has 
enlisted them.47 
When it comes to oversight, party identity is also key. When the 
President and Congress are from the same party, the majority in 
Congress will not use oversight to hold the President to task. And 
when the government is divided, Congress will make oversight a top 
priority. This pattern held true for both the Clinton and George W. 
Bush presidencies. When the President's party in Congress was in the 
majority, the opposition party bitterly complained of the majority's 
"lack[ing] backbone" and "abdicating" its responsibility for 
43. See generally C. Lawrence Evans, Committees, Leaders, and Message Politics, in 
CONGRESS RECONSIDERED 217, 219 (Lawrence C. Dodd & Bruce I. Oppenheimer eds., 7th 
ed). 
44. MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THE FEDERAL IMPEACHMENT PROCESS 193 (2d ed. 2000). 
45. !d. 
46. For a discussion of how party polarization impacts congressional hearings (with cites 
that back up all claims in this paragraph), see Devins, The Academic Expert Before Congress, 
supra note 29. 
47. !d. at 1544. 
HeinOnline -- 45 Willamette L. Rev. 410 2008-2009
410 WILLAMETTE LAW REVIEW [45:395 
oversight.48 But when the President's opponents took over Congress, 
oversight became a top priority-with the President's party accusing 
the majority of using its powers "to harass and intimidate."49 
Finally and, for my purposes, most significant, party polarization 
contributes to the rise of presidential unilateralism. When the 
Congress is polarized, members of the President's party are not likely 
to break ranks and vote to limit presidential initiatives. When 
government is unified, this means that no bill will get through 
Congress to limit presidential initiatives. When Congress is divided, 
members of the President's party will resist any opposition party 
efforts to repudiate the President. More than that, since divided 
government is increasingly common (thirty of the past forty years), it 
is also increasingly difficult for Congress to enact significant 
legislation. As such, Presidents have even more incentive to act 
unilaterally-since they cannot get Congress to enact their legislative 
agenda. 5° 
Consider, for example, Bill Clinton's health care reforms and 
George W. Bush's faith-based initiatives. In both instances, the 
President went to Congress seeking legislative authorization for his 
policy agenda. In both cases, Congress did not bite, leaving it to the 
President either to abandon his policy initiative or pursue his initiative 
through unilateral action. Clinton did so by issuing several directives 
that, among other things, "established a patient's bill of rights for 
federal employees . . . and set penalties for companies that deny 
health coverage to the poor and people with pre-existing medical 
48. Keith Bradsher, House Inquiry Is Urged on Clintons' Land Deals, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 
12, 1994, at Al6; Philip Shenon, As New 'Cop on The Beat,' Congressman Starts Patrol, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 6, 2007, at Al8. 
49. Jerry Gray, G.O.P. Accuses Administration of Political Improprieties, N.Y. TIMES, 
Apr. 8, 1995, at AlO. For a discussion of how Democrats beefed up oversight of the Bush 
administration after regaining control of Congress in 2006, see Brian Friel, The Watchdog 
Growls, NAT'L J., Mar. 23, 2007, http://www.nationaljournal.com/about/njweekly/stories/ 
2007 /0323nj l.htrn#. 
50. When the President and Congress come from the same party, it is far more likely 
that Presidents will seek to advance favored policies through legislation. With a solid 
Democratic majority in the House and a near-filibuster proof majority in the Senate, for 
example, there is good reason to think that President Barack Obama will pursue an ambitious 
legislative agenda. The success of that agenda, however, is contingent on the willingness of at 
least some Senate Republicans to cross party lines and back the President (assuming that 
Democratic lawmakers back the same policies as the President). If not, the Obama 
administration will have no choice but to advance its policy agenda through unilateral 
presidential policy-making. 
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conditions."51 Bush likewise acted unilaterally, establishing the 
White House Office of Faith Based Initiatives and ordering an audit 
of government agencies to make sure that their practices did not 
improperly discourage or forbid faith-based organizations. 52 
Political polarization, moreover, encourages Presidents to act 
unilaterally and take greater control of the administrative state. 
Specifically, with political polarization and divided government 
shifting the locus of government policymaking away from lawmaking 
and towards executive and administrative action, Presidents 
(beginning with Ronald Reagan) have used the Office of Management 
and Budget to review agency policymaking. 53 Likewise, in an effort 
to ensure that agency policymaking conforms to the President's 
policy agenda, Presidents (again beginning with Ronald Reagan) have 
made use of signing statements and pre-regulatory directives.54 
Finally, Presidents have used their appointments power to ensure 
agency loyalty to the President's agenda.55 
More than any President before him, George W. Bush pushed the 
boundaries of presidential unilateralism. "What almost no one 
disputes," wrote Adam Liptak in The New York Times, "is that a 
central legacy of the Bush presidency will be its distinctively 
muscular vision of executive power."56 The architect of this campaign 
was Vice President Dick Cheney.57 A witness to Watergate and its 
aftermath, Cheney helped staff the "White House with conservative 
veterans of the 1970s and 1980s who believed that" the President 
51. William G. Howell, Unilateral Powers: A Brief Overview, 35 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. 
Q. 417,418 (2005). 
52. /d. at 434-35. 
53. See generally Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245 
(2001). 
54. See Neal Devins, Signing Statements and Divided Government, 16 WM. & MARY 
BILL RTS. J. 63, 64-65 (2007). 
55. GEORGE C. EADS & MICHAEL FIX, RELIEF OR REFORM?: REAGAN'S REGULATORY 
DILEMMA (1984); Neal Devins & David E. Lewis, Not-So Independent Agencies: Party 
Polarization and the Limits of Institutional Design, 88 B. U. L. REV. 459 (2008); MICHAEL J. 
GERHARDT, THE FEDERAL APPOINTMENTS PROCESS: A CONSTITUTIONAL AND HISTORICAL 
ANALYSIS (2000). 
56. Adam Liptak, More Power for Executive: Will it Last?, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 30, 2007, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/30/us/politics/30issuesC.html. 
57. Among many books detailing Cheney's role, see generally JANE MAYER, THE DARK 
SIDE: THE INSIDE STORY OF HOW THE WAR ON TERROR TURNED INTO A WAR ON AMERICAN 
IDEALS (2008); CHARLIE SAVAGE, TAKEOVER: THE RETURN OF THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY 
AND THE SUBVERSION OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2007); JACK GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR 
PRESIDENCY: LAW AND JUDGMENT INSIDE THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION (2007). 
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should push his agenda "without having to compromise" and that 
Watergate-era reforms had wrongly "emasculated the presidency."58 
More to the point, just as the Nixon administration pushed the 
boundaries of executive power, the Bush administration extended the 
efforts of Ronald Reagan and Bill Clinton to assert broad inherent 
power over national security, to make use of executive orders to 
unilaterally advance policy objectives, and to centralize presidential 
control of the administrative state. To cite a few well known 
examples: the assertion of the power to indefinitely detain so-called 
enemy combatants, the establishment of a military tribunal system 
without formal congressional approval, the warrantless wiretapping of 
U.S. citizens, the robust use of executive privilege, and the expansive 
use of presidential signing statements to direct agency 
policymaking-including agency non-enforcement of laws that the 
President deems unconstitutional. 
No doubt, just as Nixon's strong view of the presidency did not 
sit well with the Supreme Court or the American people, the Bush 
White House has also suffered defeats both before the Supreme Court 
and the court of public opinion.59 Unlike the Watergate era, however, 
58. Julian E. Zelizer, The Conservative Embrace of Presidential Power, 88 B.U. L. REV. 
499, 502 (2008). 
59. President Nixon left office with a 25% approval rating; President Bush left office 
with a 22% approval rating. Maria Recio, Bush, His Approval Rating in Tatters, Flies Home 
to Texas, MIAMI HERALD, Jan. 20, 2009, awiilable at http://www.miamiherald.com/ 
inauguration/story/863517.htrnl. Before the Supreme Court, the Bush administration's record 
(on cases implicating executive power) was quite mixed. Presidential unilateralism was 
rejected in several, highly visible war on terror cases. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 
(2004); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S 557 (2006); 
Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. (2008). For a sampling of related news stories, see Robert 
Barnes, Justices Say Detainees Can Seek Release, WASH. POST, June 13,2008, at AI; David 
G. Savage, The Guantanamo Decision: High Court Rejects Bush's Claim that He Alone Sets 
Detainee Rules, L.A. TIMES, June 30, 2006, at AI; Linda Greenhouse, The Supreme Court: 
Detainees; Access to Courts, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 2004, available at 
http:/ /query .nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9407E I DE 1538F93AA 15 7 55C09629C8B63. 
On the other hand, the administration succeeded in several important (albeit less visible) cases. 
The Court limited taxpayer standing in a case involving the President's faith based initiative; it 
ruled that the Vice President had a strong interest in protecting the disclosure of private sector 
members of an energy task force that he ran; and it backed up Bush administration preemption 
arguments and, in so doing, supported administration efforts to expand federal regulatory 
power. See Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 999 (2008). For a sampling of related news 
stories, see William Branigin, Justices Quash Suit over Funds for Faith Groups, WASH. POST, 
June 26, 2007, at A6; David G. Savage, Court Lets Cheney Avoid Disclosure, L.A. TIMES, 
June 25, 2004, at AI; Linda Greenhouse, Justices Shield Medical Devices from Lawsuits, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 21, 2008, available at http://www .nytimes.com/2008/02/21/washington/21 
device.htrnl. 
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the Bush-era Congress did not enact legislation limiting the reach of 
presidential unilateralism. Political polarization, for reasons already 
detailed, is an important part of this story. But it is not the only part 
of the story. Not only did Congress lack a way to restrict presidential 
power, Congress also lacked the will to check the President. 
Members, as I will soon explain, saw no political advantage in 
defending Congress's institutional turf. 
Before explaining why lawmakers lacked the incentives to rein 
in the President, a bit of a recap. At the start of this essay, I quoted 
Justices Jackson and Ginsburg to make-what I consider-a fairly 
obvious point. Congress has the power to check the President. But if 
it does not use that power, the President has incentive to fill the void. 
That does not mean that the President can do whatever he wants. As 
was true in the war on terror cases, the Supreme Court can place some 
limits on presidential power. But without a Congress willing to assert 
its institutional prerogatives, defeats in court are not likely to stick to 
the President. Richard Nixon lost several significant cases in court.60 
But that is not the reason the presidency was hampered after Nixon 
left office. The reason was tied to the Watergate-era Congress's 
willingness to assert itself through numerous legislative enactments 
and through beefed up oversight. Remember: Dick Cheney's 
complaint about an imperiled presidency had nothing to do with 
Supreme Court decision-making and everything to do with 
congressionally imposed constraints that cut against presidential 
power.61 
Today, Congress has neither the will nor the way to pursue the 
type of bipartisan reforms that characterized the Watergate-era 
Congress. Democrats and Republicans in Congress are more 
interested in strengthening their position vis-a-vis the other party than 
in strengthening Congress as an institution. Members of the 
President's party are loyal to their party, not Congress as an 
institution, and therefore, will not join forces with the opposition 
party to assert Congress's institutional prerogatives. Equally telling, 
members of Congress see little personal gain in advancing a 
legislative agenda that shifts power from the President to Congress. 
60. See supra note 12 and accompanying text discussing the Pentagon Papers and Keith 
decisions. See also United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974) (rejecting Nixon's sweeping 
executive privilege claim). 
61. See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text 
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Unlike during the Watergate era, the American people are not 
seeking a diminution of presidential power, and especially not on 
national security matters. Disapproval of President Bush was tied to 
how he exercised his authority-not to the amount of power the 
President possesses. Indeed, today's Democratically controlled 
Congress supported President Bush on national security measures-
notwithstanding the President's low job approval rating and 
Democratic complaints about administration overreaching. In July 
2008, for example, Democrats in Congress-rather than open 
themselves up to election-year charges of being soft on national 
security-revamped an important Watergate-era statute, the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Act. Bowing to Bush administration 
demands, Democrats and Republicans joined together to immunize 
phone companies from liability when wiretapping the international 
calls ofU.S. citizens.62 
The practices of the current Congress are to be expected. 
Members of Congress hardly ever gain personal political advantage 
by embracing structural checks of presidential power. Just as 
Congress has incentive to delegate to the executive (rather than 
absorb the costs of making a decision that disfavors identifiable 
participants in the political process), Congress is more interested in 
responding to executive branch initiatives than in foreclosing 
particular types of initiatives.63 Sometimes, as was true with the 1974 
budget act, structural reforms serve the personal interests of members 
of Congress. In that case, members had a personal political interest to 
protect their authority to enact budget bills that reward constituents. 
Most of the time, however, Congress would rather respond to 
presidential initiatives than place restrictions on presidential 
authority-restrictions that shift the locus of decision making power 
to Congress (so that Congress bears the cost of decision). For this 
very reason, lawmakers rarely advance their personal political 
interests by structurally constraining the President in ways that shift 
the decision back to Congress. Indeed, the War Powers Resolution-
while ostensibly placing limits on the President-gave the President 
significant authority to launch unilateral military strikes. Congress's 
assent was not required until 60 days after the President's initiative 
62. Eric Lichtblau, Senate Approves Bill to Broaden Wiretap Powers, N.Y. TIMES, July 
I 0, 2008, available at http://www .nytimes.com/2008/07 I 10/washington/1 Ofisa.htrnl. 
63. For an insightful presentation of this point, see Harold H. Bruff, Legislative 
Formality, Administrative Rationality, 63 TEX. L. REv. 207 (1984). 
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(and only if the President triggered the clock by making a formal 
report to Congress).64 As such, Congress-while insisting it had a 
role to play-was content to play a reactive role. Long story short: 
Not only does political polarization stand as a roadblock to the 
modem Congress standing up for its institutional prerogatives, but 
lawmakers typically do not gain personal political advantage by 
placing structural limits on presidential power. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
On Tuesday November 4, 2008, Barack Obama was elected 
President. While the Obama administration will undoubtedly pursue 
a different set of policy initiatives than did the Bush administration, it 
is to be expected that President Obama will issue executive orders, 
pre-enforcement directives, review proposed agency regulations, and 
otherwise take unilateral action to advance his policy initiatives. And 
it is also to be expected that Congress will not check such presidential 
unilateralism. Today's polarized Congress lacks both the will and the 
way to check the presidency. 65 For those who embrace a 
constitutional design in which (as James Madison put it) "ambition 
must be made to counteract ambition,"66 today's system of checks and 
balances is an abject failure. 
64. For a short analysis of why the Act is largely ineffective, see FISHER, 
CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICTS BETWEEN CONGRESS AND THE PRESIDENT, supra note 13, at 
281-84. 
65. The 2008 elections, while undoubtedly significant, did not bring about change in 
party polarization. A May 2008 study found "that the ideological differences between the 
political parties are [not just] growing but that they have become embedded in American 
society itself." William A. Galston & Pietro S. Novola, Vote Like Thy Neighbor, N.Y. TIMES 
MAG., May II, 2008. Indeed, American neighborhoods now reflect three decades of 
increasing party polarization-so that "(n]early half of all Americans live in 'landslide 
counties' where Democrats or Republicans regularly win in a rout." Shankar Vedantam, Why 
the Ideological Melting Pot Is Getting So Lumpy, WASH. POST, Jan. 19, 2009, at Al2. The 
consequence of all this: an increasingly polarized Republican minority that is unlikely to work 
with an increasingly polarized Democratic majority in asserting the institutional priorities of 
Congress. For example, in the first months of the Obama administration, House Republicans 
acted in tandem-standing "firm against Mr. Obama" and, with him, congressional 
Democrats. See Adam Nagourney, In Gingrich Mold, a New Voice for Solid Republican 
Resistance, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 2009, at AI. 
66. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 322 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter, ed., 1961 ). 
